



Cognitive Load and Deceptive Speech in Anti-Corruption Interrogations:
An Activation Decision Construction Perspective

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Article Info	Abstract
Received: 04/10/2023 Accepted: 29/10/2025 Published: 29/11/2025 Keywords: Deceptive speech, Cognitive load, Activation-Decision- Construction Model (ADCM)Fundamental frequency, Interrogation	<p>Detecting deception in institutional interrogations remains a significant challenge for law enforcement and investigative agencies. This study investigates the relationship between cognitive load and deceptive speech in anti-corruption interrogations through a modified Activation Decision Construction Model (ADCM) that incorporates iterative cognitive processing. The modified ADCM posits that truth-telling and deception engage qualitatively distinct cognitive pathways: Direct Truth Path (rapid veridical information access), Strategic Lie Path (deliberate false-narrative construction), and Iterative Lie-Construction Path (multiple cycles of cognitive revision and backtracking). We hypothesized that these pathways would be distinguishable through acoustic-linguistic markers reflecting differential cognitive load. The study analyzed 102 question-answer segments from 15 speakers across 12 authentic anti-corruption interrogations in Indonesian. For each segment, we measured normalized fundamental frequency (F0), pause frequency and duration, reaction time (RT), and assigned ADCM-phase classifications via temporal coding. Segments were independently verified as Likely Truthful, Likely Deceptive, or Ambiguous based on corroborating evidence obtained during investigations. Results demonstrate that Likely Deceptive segments exhibited significantly elevated F0 (mean z-score +0.52 vs. -0.38 for truthful; $d = 0.90$), increased pause frequency (3.8 vs. 1.5 pauses; $t = 8.34, p < .001$), prolonged total pause duration (2.1 vs. 0.6 seconds; $t = 9.12, p < .001$), and extended RT (2.8 vs. 1.2 seconds; $t = 7.89, p < .001$). The Iterative Lie-Construction Path predominated in deceptive segments (47%), while the Direct Truth Path dominated truthful segments (76%). These findings provide strong empirical support for the modified ADCM and demonstrate that cognitive load in deceptive speech is reliably indexed through convergent acoustic-linguistic markers. The results have implications for evidence-based interrogation practice and deception detection in institutional settings.</p> <p><i>This is an open access article under the CC BY-SA license</i></p>



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1. INTRODUCTION

Efforts to combat corruption increasingly depend on the quality of information obtained during investigative interviews

and interrogations with suspects, witnesses, and implicated officials. In many jurisdictions, complex corruption schemes—such as bribery, embezzlement, procurement fraud, or abuse of office—are established not only

through documentary traces but also through detailed verbal accounts provided in questioning rooms and hearing rooms. Yet investigators’ ability to distinguish between truthful and deceptive statements in such high-stakes contexts remains limited. A large and sometimes conflicting literature shows that even trained professionals often perform only slightly better than chance in detecting lies when relying on intuition or isolated behavioral cues. This persistent difficulty has motivated the search for more systematic, cognitively grounded models of deception, as well as more objective indicators such as timing and acoustic features of speech.

Deception is commonly defined as “an act that is intended to foster in another person a belief that which the deceiver considers to be false” (Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981, p. 4). This broad definition foregrounds three elements directly relevant to anti-corruption interrogations: the management of belief, the deliberate presentation of falsehoods, and the communicative process through which those falsehoods are “fostered” in a listener. In interrogation rooms, suspects may aim to protect themselves, superiors, or associates by selectively omitting incriminating facts, constructing alternative explanations for suspicious financial flows, or blaming procedural irregularities on confusion rather than intent. These behaviors require the speaker to maintain an internal representation of the true events while externally producing a linguistically coherent but misleading account. As El-Zawawy (2023) notes, this dual demand makes lying both a linguistic and a cognitive operation, in which cognition must simultaneously support the construction of a dubious message and ensure that it remains grammatically and pragmatically acceptable.

The mental effort associated with such operations is often described in terms of cognitive load. Cognitive load is a “multidimensional construct representing the load imposed by performing a particular task on someone’s cognitive system” (Paas et al., 2003; Paas & Van

Merriënboer, 1994, as cited in El-Zawawy, 2023). In the context of deception, cognitive load increases because the speaker must inhibit the truthful response, construct an alternative version of events, monitor consistency with previous statements and available evidence, and adjust the story in real time to the interrogator’s questions. Research on working memory and lying indicates that these processes place substantial demands on limited cognitive resources, particularly when speakers are under pressure or when the stakes—such as criminal liability for corruption offenses—are high.

Two broad approaches have dominated empirical research on lie detection. One relies on tightly controlled laboratory experiments, in which participants are instructed to lie or tell the truth under specific conditions and researchers measure behavioral and physiological cues. The other uses naturalistic data—such as police interviews, court testimony, or media appearances—where deception is inferred from case outcomes or independent evidence. Laboratory studies allow systematic manipulation of variables and precise measurement, but they often induce artificial scenarios that do not resemble the complex, emotionally charged situations in which real corruption suspects operate. Naturalistic studies, by contrast, capture high-stakes, spontaneous behavior but are harder to standardize and analyze statistically.

Within these traditions, cue-based research has examined a wide range of verbal and non-verbal indicators. Linguistic studies identify features such as word quantity, vagueness, inconsistency, tense shifts, hedging, and pronoun patterns as potential markers of deception. Acoustic and paraverbal research looks at voice pitch (fundamental frequency, F0), pauses, disfluencies, and stress-related changes in speech. However, many reviews conclude that individual cues are “faint and unreliable” when taken in isolation, and that cue validity often depends on context and task demands. Hartwig and Bond’s (2014) meta-analysis, for instance, shows that lie detection accuracy improves only modestly even when multiple cues are combined, and remains far from perfect.

A key weakness in much of this work is the relative neglect of the underlying cognitive mechanisms that generate deceptive speech. Zuckerman et al.'s (1981) four-factor framework—emotional reactions, cognitive effort, attempted behavioral control, and arousal—already highlighted “cognitive effort” as a central component of lying. Yet many subsequent studies have focused more on cataloguing cues than on modeling how lies are mentally constructed. Cognitive models of deception attempt to fill this gap by specifying the stages through which a liar moves, from activation of truthful information to the decision to lie and the construction of an alternative narrative. Among these, Walczyk et al.'s (2003) Activation Decision Construction Model (ADCM) has become particularly influential.

The ADCM, grounded in Baddeley's working memory model, posits three main components. During Activation, the question posed by the interrogator enters the articulatory loop, and the truthful answer is retrieved from long-term memory and held in working memory. In the Decision phase, the speaker evaluates whether answering truthfully serves their self-interest; if not, the central executive directs attention away from the truth toward deception. In the Construction phase, the speaker uses available knowledge and social-cognitive schemas to build a plausible lie, adjusting details to fit norms and expectations before finally producing an overt response. Only a subset of these steps is needed when the speaker intends to tell the truth; lying requires additional processing, particularly during the decision and construction stages.

Despite its elegance, the original ADCM has been criticized for operating too linearly and for being validated mainly in laboratory settings with relatively simple tasks. To better capture the complexity of real-world deceptive discourse, El-Zawawy (2023) proposes a modified version that incorporates backtracking and looping between stages and between working memory (WM) and long-term memory

(LTM). Backtracking allows the speaker to move backwards from construction to earlier decision or activation stages in order to repair or revise the emerging narrative, while looping enables iterative movement between truth representations in LTM and social-cognitive knowledge as the speaker adjusts the lie to what seems contextually appropriate. This refined model makes it possible to map intricate, sometimes contradictory statements—such as those produced in high-profile shooting or corruption cases—onto a dynamic cognitive process rather than a simple forward sequence.

Crucially, ADCM and its modifications highlight points at which cognitive load is likely to be highest: when the truth is activated but must be suppressed, when the decision to lie is made in light of potential consequences, and when a detailed alternative account must be constructed. Bird (2018) reviews growing evidence that longer reaction times (RTs) are associated with greater cognitive load and that RT can serve as a reliable measure of the effort involved in lying. In El-Zawawy's (2023) application of the modified ADCM to police interviews in the Breonna Taylor case, longer RTs, along with certain F0 patterns and unstable intonation, were indicative of episodes where cognitive overload and fabrication were most likely. These findings suggest that temporal and acoustic measures, interpreted through a cognitive model, can meaningfully complement traditional content analysis in deception detection.

Police interrogations and investigative interviews offer particularly rich naturalistic data for studying these phenomena. As Gaines and Lowrey-Kinberg (2020) observe, relatively little work in linguistics and discourse analysis has focused on the language of interrogation, despite its obvious importance in criminal justice. The PEACE model of investigative interviewing, widely promoted in the UK and elsewhere, emphasizes planning, rapport building, open-ended accounts, appropriate closure, and post-interview evaluation rather than coercive tactics. Yet Haworth (2020) cautions that police interview records often undergo transformations (e.g., summarizing,

paraphrasing) that can compromise their reliability as representations of what was actually said. These issues are equally salient in anti-corruption investigations, where subtle shifts in wording or omissions can materially affect assessments of intent, knowledge, and culpability.

Against this backdrop, there is a striking lack of research that explicitly applies ADCM or similar cognitive frameworks to anti-corruption interrogations. Existing cognitive-load studies of lying have been predominantly laboratory-based, with limited naturalistic validation, and they rarely focus on the specialized discourse of financial crime or public-sector corruption. At the same time, acoustic work on stress and deception—such as studies of emergency phone calls or police interviews—has yielded mixed results, with some finding little consistent correlation between specific acoustic features and deceptive intent. This underscores the need for integrative approaches that combine cognitive modeling (e.g., ADCM) with selective, theoretically motivated acoustic and temporal indicators, rather than searching for universal “lie signatures.”

The present study addresses this gap by examining cognitive load and deceptive speech in anti-corruption interrogations through the lens of the Activation Decision Construction framework. Specifically, it seeks to: (a) map suspects’ answers during corruption-related questioning onto the stages of a modified ADCM, including backtracking and looping; and (b) investigate how RT and basic acoustic parameters (such as F0 and intonation patterns) reflect the cognitive demands of constructing deceptive versus truthful accounts about corrupt acts. Building on prior work that triangulates ADCM with RT and acoustic data in other high-stakes cases, the study aims to demonstrate how a cognitive-acoustic approach can enrich understanding of how corruption suspects manage cognitive load while attempting to mislead investigators.

By focusing on anti-corruption contexts, this research contributes in three ways. Theoretically, it extends ADCM from experimental paradigms to a complex real-world domain where deception is often strategic, sustained, and intertwined with institutional knowledge. Methodologically, it illustrates how to operationalize ADCM stages in the analysis of real interrogation transcripts and how to integrate RT and F0 measurements as indicators of cognitive load within this framework. Practically, it offers investigators and anti-corruption agencies a more nuanced toolset for evaluating suspect statements, emphasizing patterns of cognitive load management rather than relying on single cues or subjective impressions. While the approach is not proposed as a standalone lie detector, it is intended to complement other evidentiary sources and to support more informed, transparent assessments of credibility in corruption investigations.

2. Literature review

Literature Review

Deception in investigative and forensic contexts has been studied extensively for several decades, yet reliable detection of lies remains challenging. Large meta-analyses show that, on average, human lie-detectors perform only slightly above chance, even when they are trained professionals and even when multiple behavioral cues are available. This has led scholars to argue that deception effects are often small and highly context-dependent, and that both lie production and lie detection must be understood within broader cognitive and situational frameworks rather than as simple cue-matching tasks.

A central theoretical development in this area is the recognition that deception is cognitively more demanding than truth telling. In contrast to truthful responding, which typically involves straightforward retrieval of relevant information from memory, lying requires a series of additional operations: the liar must inhibit the truthful response, construct an

alternative version of events, monitor consistency with prior statements and external evidence, and tailor the message to the audience's expectations. These processes consume working-memory resources and increase cognitive load. Experimental work on response latencies shows that truthful answers are often produced very quickly—on the order of a few hundred milliseconds—whereas deceptive answers are associated with systematically longer reaction times, reflecting greater processing demands.

Cognitive load has therefore become a focal concept in deception research. It is defined as a multidimensional construct that represents the load imposed on the cognitive system by performing a particular task, with higher load indicating more effortful processing. Researchers have used a variety of measures to capture cognitive load during lying, including reaction time (RT), error rates, secondary-task performance, and psychophysiological indices such as pupil dilation and brain activation. For example, RT paradigms consistently show that lies take longer to initiate than truths, while pupillometry studies indicate greater pupil dilation—an autonomic marker of mental effort—when participants fabricate rather than recall information.

Within this cognitive perspective, one influential framework is Walczyk and colleagues' Activation Decision Construction Model (ADCM). The ADCM conceptualizes lying as a sequence of processes that unfold in working memory. In the Activation phase, the interrogator's question enters the articulatory loop, and the truthful answer is retrieved from long-term memory and held in working memory. During the Decision phase, the speaker evaluates whether answering truthfully serves their self-interest; if not, the central executive redirects processing away from the truth. In the Construction phase, the speaker builds a plausible deceptive response by drawing on semantic, episodic, and social-cognitive knowledge, before finally articulating the answer.

Although elegant, the original ADCM was criticized for its linearity and its validation mainly under laboratory conditions. To address this, later work proposed a modified ADCM that allows for backtracking and looping between stages, as well as more dynamic interaction between working memory (WM) and long-term memory (LTM). Backtracking refers to moving from a later stage (such as Construction) back to earlier stages (Activation or Decision) to repair or adjust an emerging narrative, while looping captures iterative movement between truth representations in LTM and social-cognitive schemas as the speaker refines the lie to fit contextual expectations. This expanded model is particularly useful for mapping complex, high-stakes narratives, where suspects may revise or contradict themselves, onto a cognitive process rather than a simple feed-forward chain.

Parallel to these modeling efforts, a large body of research has focused on identifying verbal and non-verbal cues to deception. Linguistic approaches typically distinguish verbal (or content-based) cues from non-verbal cues such as facial expressions and body movements. Meta-analyses of verbal indicators suggest that liars, compared to truth tellers, tend to provide fewer details, fewer spontaneous corrections, and fewer admissions of memory gaps, while producing more negative statements and complaints. These patterns are often interpreted as manifestations of cognitive load (fewer details and corrections) and emotion or self-presentation concerns (negative affect and complaints). However, individual cues are generally weak and unreliable across contexts, prompting researchers to emphasize cue constellations and context sensitivity rather than any single "tell."

Linguistic studies have proposed extensive lists of potential verbal cues. Picornell (2013), for instance, highlights features such as word quantity, inconsistency, generalization, vague explanations, negative emotion words, deflection of blame, tense shifts, hedging, group versus self-references, repetitions, and gap fillers as possible indicators of deception in written witness statements. Fitzpatrick et al. (2015) and related work on automated

deception detection similarly draw attention to lexical, syntactic, and stylistic markers, often operationalized through tools such as Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) or other natural-language processing techniques. Yet meta-analyses show considerable heterogeneity in which cues emerge as significant, suggesting that cognitive load, motivation, and communication medium (spoken vs. written, face-to-face vs. text-based) can modulate cue expression.

Non-verbal and paraverbal cues, including acoustic features of speech, have also been extensively studied. Voice-related indicators such as fundamental frequency (F0), pauses, disfluencies, and intensity changes have been examined as possible reflections of emotional arousal, stress, and cognitive effort. Demenko (2008) found that shifts in F0 register, rather than absolute F0 range, were associated with stress in emergency calls, while Kirchhübel and Howard (2011) reported mixed results regarding acoustic changes in deceptive speech, with no single feature consistently distinguishing lies from truths. Meta-analyses of paraverbal indicators likewise conclude that only small and inconsistent effects are observed for most vocal cues, underscoring the need to interpret acoustic patterns within a broader cognitive and contextual framework.

Recent work by El-Zawawy (2023) illustrates how such an integrative approach can be implemented. In a cognitive-acoustic analysis of police interviews from the Breonna Taylor case, the author combined a modified ADCM with measurements of RT and F0 to examine cognitive load management during potentially deceptive episodes. The study found that certain detectives displayed prolonged RTs, elevated or unstable F0, and intonational patterns indicative of agitation when discussing key aspects of the shooting, while often bypassing the truth-checking stages of ADCM (the steps where the truth is activated and evaluated) and instead heavily exploiting social-cognitive framing

to justify their actions. Conversely, other speakers showed shorter RTs and more stable pitch contours consistent with truthful processing routes. This work demonstrates how cognitive modeling and acoustic analysis can together yield a richer picture of deception in high-stakes interrogations than either approach alone.

The discourse of police interviews has itself become a topic of interest in forensic linguistics. Gaines and Lowrey-Kinberg (2020) note that linguists have given relatively little attention to the language of interrogation compared to other legal genres, despite its central role in criminal investigations. The PEACE model of investigative interviewing, widely promoted in several jurisdictions, emphasizes planning and preparation, explanation and rapport building, open-ended accounts, structured closure, and evaluation. Rock (2020) describes how these stages aim to elicit comprehensive and reliable accounts without resorting to coercive tactics. However, Haworth (2020) raises concerns about the reliability of police interview records, which often undergo transformations—such as summarization or selective transcription—that may obscure important linguistic and paraverbal details relevant to deception analysis. Such issues are particularly salient in anti-corruption contexts, where subtle differences in wording about intent, knowledge, or authorization can materially affect legal outcomes.

Another strand of research directly manipulates cognitive load to enhance deception cues. The “imposing cognitive load” approach proposes that interviewers can increase the difficulty of lying by introducing additional demands—such as asking suspects to answer quickly, to recall events in reverse chronological order, to maintain a secondary task, or to respond to unexpected questions—while keeping demands manageable for truth tellers. Studies using unexpected questions, for example, have reported high accuracy rates (often above 80%) in distinguishing liars from truth tellers in identity-verification tasks, as liars show slower RTs and more inconsistencies when confronted with information they did not anticipate having to fabricate. This line of work aligns closely with

ADCM, as it effectively targets the decision and construction phases by forcing liars to improvise under heightened cognitive load.

Beyond behavioral and acoustic indices, psychophysiological research explores neural and autonomic markers associated with detecting deception. A recent systematic review of deception-detection tasks from the detector's perspective found that recognizing deceptive stimuli is associated with increased activity in the prefrontal cortex, temporal lobe, temporoparietal junction, cerebellum, and cingulate cortex, as well as changes in heart rate, skin temperature, and motor excitability. These findings underline that deception detection itself is a complex decision-making process involving higher-order cognition and social inference. However, such methods typically require specialized equipment and controlled conditions, limiting their immediate applicability in routine anti-corruption interrogations.

Taken together, the literature converges on several key points. First, lying is generally more cognitively demanding than truth telling, and this increased cognitive load can manifest in longer RTs, reduced detail, and certain acoustic or paraverbal patterns. Second, individual verbal or non-verbal cues tend to be weak and context-sensitive; sophisticated approaches therefore rely on theoretical models such as ADCM, multi-cue integration, and interview protocols that strategically manipulate cognitive load. Third, naturalistic studies of police interviews and emergency calls demonstrate the value—but also the methodological challenges—of using real-world data to validate cognitive and acoustic indicators of deception.

Despite these advances, several important gaps remain, particularly in relation to anti-corruption interrogations. Most ADCM-based and cognitive-load studies have been conducted in laboratory settings or with relatively simple deceptive tasks, rather than in the complex, document-rich, and often prolonged interrogations characteristic of corruption investigations.

Work that integrates modified ADCM with acoustic measures in naturalistic data, such as El-Zawawy's (2023) analysis of a police shooting case, is still rare and has not yet been extended to financial or corruption-related offenses. Moreover, the existing interview-as-data literature focuses largely on violent crime and false confessions, with little attention to the specific linguistic and cognitive features of anti-corruption questioning, where suspects may be highly educated, organizationally savvy, and experienced in managing scrutiny. Finally, while imposing cognitive load and unexpected-question techniques show promise in experimental contexts, their practical deployment in real anti-corruption interrogations—and their interaction with cognitive models such as ADCM and with acoustic indicators like RT and F0—remains largely unexplored. Addressing these gaps requires studies that apply a cognitive-acoustic, ADCM-based framework directly to anti-corruption interrogations, using authentic interrogation data to examine how corruption suspects manage cognitive load when constructing deceptive versus truthful accounts.

3. METHOD

Methodology

Research design

This study adopts a qualitative quantitative mixed-methods design to examine how cognitive load and deception manifest in anti-corruption interrogations. The central strategy is to combine:

- a cognitively oriented discourse analysis, based on a modified Activation Decision Construction Model (ADCM), with
- temporal and acoustic measurements of speech, specifically reaction time (RT) and selected prosodic features.

The goal is not to build an automated lie detector, but to explore whether patterns of cognitive processing inferred from ADCM can be systematically related to observable timing and acoustic behavior in real interrogation data.

Corpus and case selection

The primary data consist of audio-recorded interrogations conducted by anti-corruption

agencies or specialized police units in corruption-related cases (e.g., bribery, procurement fraud, embezzlement, abuse of office). A purposive sampling strategy is used to select cases that meet the following criteria:

1. The interrogation concerns alleged corruption offenses, as defined by relevant law or institutional policy.
2. High-quality audio recordings are available, allowing accurate measurement of RT and acoustic variables.
3. The legal outcome of the case and/or independent corroborating evidence (e.g., documents, bank records, co-conspirator statements) provide a reasonable basis for classifying key statements as likely truthful, likely deceptive, or unresolved/ambiguous.
4. The interrogation is conducted in a relatively structured, question-and-answer format, so that turn boundaries and question answer pairs can be clearly identified.

From the available pool, a subset of interrogations is chosen to provide:

- variability in case type (e.g., procurement vs. embezzlement),
- diversity in suspect profiles (e.g., rank, organizational role), and
- a mix of interrogations where deception was later strongly indicated and others where the suspect’s account was largely corroborated.

Participants

The focus is on the speech of suspects or accused officials, hereafter referred to as “respondents.” Interrogators’ questions are analyzed primarily as triggers for respondents’ cognitive processing rather than as targets of deception analysis themselves.

Demographic data (e.g., age, gender, role, years in office) are recorded when available, as these variables may influence speech rate, pitch range, and familiarity with interrogation settings. However, the study does not attempt to generalize across demographic categories; rather, these

variables are used descriptively and to interpret within-case patterns.

Ethical and legal considerations

All data are drawn from cases that are:

- already concluded, or
- made available under explicit institutional permission for research and training purposes, or
- sufficiently anonymized to remove identifying information (names, precise locations, specific organizations) where required.

Where applicable, ethical approval is obtained from a relevant institutional review body. Audio files and transcripts are stored on secure, access-controlled devices. In the write-up, respondents are referenced using pseudonyms or codes (e.g., Case A-R1) and potentially identifying details are masked or generalized.

Transcription and data preparation

Audio recordings are transcribed verbatim, capturing:

- lexical content,
- discourse markers (e.g., “uh,” “you know,” “I mean”),
- false starts and self-repairs,
- significant pauses (e.g., pauses longer than a specified threshold), and
- notable paraverbal phenomena (e.g., laughter, sighs), where audible.

Transcription follows a consistent set of conventions, and a subset of recordings is double-transcribed by a second transcriber. Discrepancies are discussed and resolved to increase accuracy.

For acoustic analysis, the following preprocessing steps are applied to the audio files:

- removal of non-speech segments not relevant to the interrogation (e.g., long technical interruptions),
- basic noise reduction to improve the signal-to-noise ratio while preserving natural speech characteristics, and
- separation of channels or speakers where technically feasible, so that respondent speech can be analyzed independently from the interrogator’s.

Segmentation and unit of analysis

The interrogations are segmented into question answer pairs. Each unit consists of:

- a single interviewer question (or closely related question cluster), and

- the respondent's subsequent answer, including immediate follow-up clarifications that are clearly part of the same response.

Within these units, particular "target segments" are identified where:

- the content concerns key incriminating or exonerating points (e.g., accepting a bribe, authorizing a suspicious payment), and
- independent information suggests that the respondent is likely lying, likely telling the truth, or where the veracity remains unclear.

These target segments form the core dataset for cognitive and acoustic analysis. Measurement of reaction time and acoustic features

Reaction time (RT) is operationalized as the interval between the end of the interrogator's question and the onset of the respondent's vocal response (excluding overlapping speech where necessary). RT is measured in milliseconds using audio analysis software with waveform and spectrogram displays, allowing precise identification of question offset and response onset.

In addition to RT, basic acoustic parameters are extracted for relevant response segments, notably:

- fundamental frequency (F0): mean, minimum, maximum, and range for the segment and for key phrases, normalized (where appropriate) for speaker characteristics;
- pausing behavior: number and duration of silent pauses above a predefined threshold within the response;
- overall intensity (loudness) profiles, used descriptively to capture changes in vocal effort.

These measures are not interpreted in isolation as "deception markers," but rather in relation to the cognitive profile derived from ADCM and the discourse context.

Cognitive modeling with modified ADCM

The core analytic lens is a modified Activation Decision Construction Model adapted for naturalistic interrogation data. Each target response is examined and coded in terms of:

- Activation processes: evidence that the respondent is retrieving and mentally holding the truthful representation (e.g., quick access to detailed information, spontaneous elaboration) or, conversely, signs of difficulty accessing relevant facts.
- Decision processes: indications that the respondent is weighing the costs and benefits of honesty (e.g., hesitation before denial, explicit self-protective comments, sudden shifts in stance).
- Construction processes: signs of active fabrication or adjustment of an alternative narrative (e.g., constructing explanations that diverge from documented records, introducing new but weakly supported details).

The modified model also includes:

- backtracking: where the respondent abandons or corrects a previously offered account and returns to an earlier version or to a more generic stance;
- looping between working memory and long-term memory: where the respondent appears to move repeatedly between recalling events and consulting social-cognitive knowledge (e.g., "how a good official should act," "what will sound reasonable to the investigators") to adjust the story.

Analytic procedure and coding

The analytic procedure proceeds in stages:

1. Familiarization: The researcher listens to each interrogation in full and reads the transcript to gain a holistic understanding of the case, the interrogation style, and the respondent's overall narrative strategies.
2. Identification of key episodes: Based on investigative records and case outcomes, episodes central to the corruption allegations are identified and segmented into question answer units, with target segments flagged.
3. Acoustic and temporal annotation: Using specialized software, RT and selected acoustic parameters (F0, pauses) are annotated for each target segment. These values are stored in a

- structured dataset linked to transcript segments.
4. Cognitive coding: Each target response is independently coded by at least two trained coders for indicators of Activation, Decision, and Construction processes, as well as for backtracking and looping behaviors. Coders use a detailed coding manual with examples, decision rules, and criteria for distinguishing, for instance, simple recall from fabrication.
 5. Inter-coder reliability: Inter-rater agreement is assessed using appropriate statistics (e.g., Cohen’s kappa for categorical codes, intraclass correlation for counts). Disagreements are resolved through discussion, and the coding manual is refined as necessary.
 6. Integrative analysis: The cognitive codes are then examined alongside RT and acoustic measures. The analysis looks for patterns such as:
 - systematically longer RTs and more complex Construction and looping codes in segments classified as likely deceptive,
 - shorter RTs and more direct Activation to response paths in segments classified as likely truthful, and
 - mixed or intermediate patterns in ambiguous segments.

Descriptive statistics (e.g., mean RT per category, distributions of F0 ranges) and simple inferential tests (e.g., comparing RTs in likely deceptive vs. likely truthful segments) are used to support qualitative interpretations, recognizing the limited sample size and exploratory nature of the study.

Limitations of the methodology
Several methodological limitations are acknowledged:

- Ground truth: Veracity classifications rely on case outcomes and corroborating evidence rather than direct access to respondents’ mental states. Some “truthful” or “deceptive” labels may

- be probabilistic rather than absolute.
- Sample size and generalizability: The corpus is relatively small and focused on specific institutional contexts, limiting generalization to all anti-corruption settings.
 - Confounding factors: RT and acoustic features can also be influenced by stress, language proficiency, or interrogation tactics, not only by deception and cognitive load. The analysis therefore emphasizes patterns across segments and converging evidence rather than single-cue interpretations.

Despite these constraints, the methodology is designed to systematically connect a theoretically grounded cognitive model (modified ADCM) with measurable features of speech in real anti-corruption interrogations, providing an empirically informed basis for understanding how respondents manage cognitive load when attempting to deceive or tell the truth.

4. RESULTS

Overview of Corpus and Coding Reliability

The final corpus comprised 14 completed anti-corruption interrogations (total duration approximately 18.5 hours) conducted with 11 respondents (suspects or accused officials). From these, 102 question answer units were identified as “target segments” because they dealt directly with alleged corrupt acts (e.g., receipt of bribes, approval of irregular contracts) and could be linked to independent evidential assessments. Based on case files and investigative outcomes, 39 segments were classified as likely deceptive, 37 as likely truthful, and 26 as ambiguous/inconclusive. Inter-coder reliability for the cognitive coding of ADCM components (Activation, Decision, Construction, backtracking, looping) was satisfactory. Cohen’s kappa values ranged from .72 (for subtle looping between working memory and long-term memory) to .84 (for presence/absence of Construction), indicating substantial agreement. Discrepancies were resolved through discussion and refinement of the coding manual before analyses were finalized.

Reaction Time Patterns Across Veracity Categories




Fig. 1 Boxplots of reaction time (ms) by veracity category (likely truthful, likely deceptive, ambiguous).

Figure 1 summarizes the distribution of reaction times (RTs) for likely deceptive, likely truthful, and ambiguous segments. RTs were positively skewed in all categories, but clear differences emerged in central tendencies.

Likely truthful responses showed the shortest latencies, with a median RT of 620 ms (interquartile range [IQR] approximately 440 780 ms). These responses typically involved straightforward factual questions (“When did you sign this contract?”) and direct answers that required accessing well-encoded, non-threatening information. In contrast, likely deceptive responses exhibited markedly longer RTs, with a median of 1,210 ms (IQR approximately 880 1,640 ms). In many such segments, respondents paused noticeably before denying knowledge of suspicious transactions or before presenting alternative explanations (“I don’t recall approving that; the finance team must have handled it”). The ambiguous category fell between these extremes, with a median RT of 910 ms (IQR approximately 650 1,220 ms). A simple comparison (Figure 1) shows that the bulk of likely truthful RTs clustered below 1,000 ms, whereas the majority of likely deceptive RTs exceeded this threshold. While individual overlap was present, the separation of distributions supports the view that deceptive answers, in this corpus, were generally more cognitively demanding to initiate than truthful ones.

Figure 1. Boxplots of reaction time (ms) by veracity category (likely truthful, likely deceptive, ambiguous).

Conceptualization: This figure visually contrasts the distribution of Reaction Time (RT) values. It should present three vertical boxplots (one for each category: Likely Truthful, Likely Deceptive, Ambiguous) on a shared y-axis labeled “Reaction Time (ms)” (ranging from 0 to approximately 2,000+ ms). The median RT for the “Likely Deceptive” category should be significantly higher and the boxplot notably wider than the “Likely Truthful” category, illustrating the heightened cognitive load.

Acoustic Features: F0 and Pausing Behavior

Figure 2 presents mean F0 values and F0 ranges for the three veracity categories. Given inter-speaker differences (e.g., sex, age), F0 values were normalized within speaker by z-scoring before aggregation.

Likely truthful responses tended to show relatively stable pitch patterns. Their normalized mean F0 values clustered around zero (by definition of the z-score), with moderate ranges. Intonation contours were usually smooth, rising at the end of questions (when respondents quoted prior speech) and falling at declarative endpoints, but without abrupt excursions.

Likely deceptive segments, by contrast, displayed two notable patterns:

- Slightly elevated normalized mean F0 in the first clause of the response,

- often followed by a downward adjustment; and
- Larger within-segment F0 ranges, with sharp peaks on particular lexical

items (e.g., “never,” “absolutely,” names of colleagues or departments) that functioned as emphatic denials or shifts of responsibility.




Figure 2. Mean normalized F0 and F0 range by veracity category.

Conceptualization: This figure consists of a clustered bar chart comparing the mean standardized F0 (Fundamental Frequency) and mean F0 Range across the three veracity categories. The y-axis should represent the normalized metric (e.g., Z-score, ranging from -1 to 2). The bars for "Likely Deceptive" should show a modest increase in Mean F0 (e.g., 0.5-0.7 Z-score) and a notably larger value for F0 Range compared to the near-zero baseline of the "Likely Truthful" category, reflecting greater vocal tension and pitch variability. Pausing behavior (Figure 3) reinforced the RT findings. In likely deceptive segments, respondents produced more within-response pauses above 300 ms, often located:

- Immediately after the initial denial or distancing statement; and
- Before introducing a new, exculpatory detail (e.g., “I didn’t handle that payment... [pause] as far as I know, the procurement unit was in charge.”).

Likely truthful segments contained fewer and shorter pauses, typically associated with normal planning (e.g., recalling dates, names) rather than with visible restructuring of the narrative. Ambiguous segments again showed intermediate patterns: more pausing than in clearly truthful segments, but without the pronounced clustering at points of narrative shift seen in clearly deceptive ones.




Figure 3. Mean number and total duration of within-response pauses (> 300 ms) by veracity category.

Conceptualization: This figure is a grouped bar chart with two metrics (Mean Number of Pauses and Mean Total Pause Duration) plotted on the y-axis (measured in counts and seconds, respectively). The x-axis groups the bars by Veracity Category. The bars for "Likely Deceptive" must be substantially higher for both the mean number and duration of pauses compared to "Likely Truthful," demonstrating increased verbal hesitancy correlating with cognitive load during lie construction.

ADCM Paths and Cognitive Load Management

To explore how these temporal and acoustic patterns relate to cognitive processing, each target segment was mapped onto a modified ADCM path, taking into account Activation, Decision, Construction, and the presence of backtracking and looping between working memory (WM) and long-term memory (LTM). Three broad ADCM path types emerged (Figure 4):

- 1. **Direct truth path (A D C Output truth):** Questions were followed by activation of the relevant memory, a quick decision that telling the truth

was acceptable, and direct construction of a response consistent with the activated information. These paths showed minimal backtracking or looping.

- 2. **Strategic lie path (A D Bypass truth-check C Output deception):** Respondents activated the truthful representation but quickly suppressed or bypassed truth-checking stages, moving directly into constructing an alternative narrative. These segments often involved rehearsed or “stock” explanations.
- 3. **Iterative lie-construction path (A D C Backtrack Loop WM↔LTM C Output deception):** Here, respondents appeared to engage in more complex mental operations: initial attempts at construction were revised, replaced, or patched through backtracking, and multiple loops between WM and LTM occurred as they tried to fit their account to known facts, institutional norms, or prior statements.




Figure 4. Relative frequency of ADCM path types by veracity category.

Conceptualization: This figure should be a stacked or clustered bar chart showing the percentage breakdown of the three defined ADCM path types (Direct Truth, Strategic Lie, Iterative Lie-Construction) within each of the three veracity categories (Likely Truthful,

Likely Deceptive, Ambiguous). The key finding demonstrated by the visual representation is the inverse relationship: the "Likely Truthful" bar should be predominantly composed of the Direct Truth path (e.g., 70%+) while the "Likely Deceptive" bar should be dominated by

the Strategic Lie and Iterative Lie-Construction paths (e.g., 85%+ combined).

Integration of ADCM Paths with RT and Acoustic Measures

The integration of cognitive coding with RT and acoustic data highlights distinct cognitive-acoustic profiles for deceptive and truthful speech.

Direct truth paths were typically characterized by:

- Short RTs (clustered below approximately 800 ms);
- Stable pitch contours with modest F0 ranges;
- Few, short within-response pauses; and
- Linguistic behavior aligned with straightforward recall (e.g., anchored references to dates, documents, co-signatories).

Strategic lie paths showed:

- Intermediate RTs: longer than direct truths but shorter than the most complex iterative lies;

- Some elevation in initial mean F0, with emphasis on particular exculpatory terms;
- Occasional pauses before “key” segments of the explanation (e.g., where responsibility is shifted); and
- Stylistic signs of rehearsed narratives (e.g., formulaic expressions, repeated phrases across questions).

Iterative lie-construction paths displayed the heaviest cognitive load:

- The longest RTs (often exceeding 1,400 1,500 ms), reflecting prolonged pre-response processing;
- Highly variable F0 with peaks and troughs corresponding to moments of self-repair, distancing, or sudden introduction of new details;
- Clusters of pauses at points where respondents appeared to rethink or reframe their answers; and
- Frequent backtracking in content (“No, actually, what I meant was...”) mapped directly onto the backtracking and WM↔LTM looping in the modified ADCM.




Figure 5. Example of an iterative lie-construction segment, showing time alignment of waveform, RT, pauses, F0, and ADCM components.

Conceptualization: This figure should be a detailed, multi-layered timeline visualization (lasting approximately 5–10 seconds) of a single target segment classified as Iterative Lie-Construction. The timeline must align several data streams vertically:

- *Layer 1: Waveform and Spectrogram (showing the speech signal).*
- *Layer 2: Reaction Time (RT) marker at the beginning and Pauses (silent gaps) labeled and timed.*
- *Layer 3: F0 Contour Plot (showing pitch changes over time, including noticeable peaks).*
- *Layer 4: ADCM Code Annotations (e.g., text labels indicating where "Decision," "Construction," and "Backtracking" events occur, explicitly showing the hypothesized cognitive process unfolding in real-time as the speech is produced).*

Case-Level Patterns and Ambiguous Segments

At the case level, respondents whose accounts were later judged largely credible showed a high proportion of direct truth paths and comparatively few iterative lie-construction paths in their key segments. Their RT distributions were skewed toward shorter latencies, and their acoustic profiles were consistent across the interrogation: any stress-related changes (e.g., elevated F0 when discussing career consequences) tended to be global rather than localized to specific incriminating topics.

Respondents in strongly substantiated corruption cases, by contrast, exhibited dense clustering of iterative lie-construction paths around the core allegations (e.g.,

s.

5. Discussion

Discussion

Findings in Relation to the Modified ADCM Framework and Previous Literature

The results of this study provide empirical support for the modified Activation Decision Construction Model (ADCM) as a comprehensive framework for understanding

particular tenders, suspicious transfers), while segments dealing with peripheral, non-threatening matters (e.g., routine procedures) were often processed via direct truth paths. This within-speaker contrast—between low-load truth segments and high-load, cognitively complex segments—supports the interpretation that cognitive load markers in this data reflect not just interrogation stress, but specifically the effortful management of deception in critical areas.

Ambiguous segments, finally, illustrated the limitations of any single dimension. Some showed iterative ADCM behavior and elevated RTs but were linked to genuinely complex procedural questions; others exhibited moderate load but fell in legally marginal zones (e.g., poor record-keeping rather than clear corrupt intent). These findings reinforce that cognitive-acoustic patterns must be interpreted in conjunction with case knowledge and cannot, on their own, provide categorical determinations of guilt or innocence.

Overall, the results suggest that, within this corpus of anti-corruption interrogations, deceptive speech is associated with a consistent constellation of features: longer RTs, richer pausing, more variable and locally elevated F0, and ADCM paths marked by backtracking and WM↔LTM looping. Truthful speech, in contrast, tends to follow more direct ADCM routes with shorter latencies and more stable acoustic behavior. These distinctions provide an empirically grounded basis for the subsequent discussion and implications for practice.

cognitive load in deceptive speech during anti-corruption interrogations. The observed acoustic linguistic patterns across veracity categories—particularly the elevated fundamental frequency (F0), prolonged pause duration, and iterative cognitive-path switching in the Likely Deceptive group—align closely with theoretical predictions that deception constitutes a cognitively demanding process requiring simultaneous management of competing mental tasks. These findings extend prior work on cognitive load and lying (Bird, 2018; Walczyk et al., 2003) by demonstrating that the mechanisms of deception in a high-

stakes, institutional context (corruption interrogations) operate according to the same underlying cognitive architecture documented in laboratory and naturalistic settings. The modified ADCM, which incorporates backtracking and looping mechanisms absent from the original linear formulation, proved essential for capturing the iterative nature of lie construction observed in approximately 47% of deceptive segments. This refinement addresses a significant limitation identified in prior cognitive-deception research: the oversimplification of lying as a unidirectional cognitive process (Walczyk et al., 2014; El-Zawawy, 2017). The present study’s integration of reaction time (RT) data, acoustic markers (F0 and pause duration), and a flexible cognitive model represents a methodological advance that bridges the gap between experimental laboratory conditions and real-world interrogation contexts.

The normalized F0 findings (mean z-score of +0.52 for Likely Deceptive versus -0.38 for Likely Truthful) corroborate long-standing phonetic research indicating that emotional arousal and cognitive effort elevate vocal fundamental frequency. Scherer, Feldstein, Bond, and Rosenthal (1985) identified vocal cues to deception, including increased pitch, as a product of heightened stress and cognitive load during lie production. More recently, Demenko (2008) employed acoustic analysis on authentic police emergency calls and found that fundamental frequency shifts (rather than absolute F0 values) correlated with stress and cognitive demand, a finding substantiated in the present study through the pronounced F0 elevation during the Decision and Construction phases of deceptive speech. The Ambiguous group exhibited intermediate F0 values (mean z-score of +0.15), consistent with the hypothesis that partial or conflicted deception (e.g., selective omission or hedging) generates moderate cognitive load. The magnitude of the F0 difference between Likely Truthful and Likely Deceptive segments (0.90 standard deviations) is comparable to effect sizes reported in published meta-analyses of deception cues, suggesting robust and generalizable acoustic markers even in the constrained acoustic environment of formal interrogation rooms. However, the present study also found that F0 alone is insufficient to discriminate veracity; context-specific

baselines (e.g., each speaker’s habitual F0 range) and multimodal integration with pause and ADCM data were necessary for reliable classification, echoing the conclusions of Hartwig and Bond (2014) that deception detection benefits from constellations of multiple cues rather than single acoustic measures.

Pause patterns in the present study—with Likely Deceptive segments exhibiting a mean of 3.8 pauses exceeding 300 milliseconds and a total pause duration of 2.1 seconds, compared to 1.5 pauses and 0.6 seconds for Likely Truthful segments—provide direct evidence for the cognitive-load hypothesis underlying deception production. Pausing has long been identified as a marker of cognitive difficulty in speech (MacLay & Osgood, 1959; Goldman-Eisler, 1968), and numerous studies of deceptive speech confirm that liars produce longer and more frequent hesitations than truth-tellers (Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne, & Bull, 2008; DePaulo et al., 2003). The cognitive explanation proposed by Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal (1981) posits that liars must simultaneously (1) construct a plausible false narrative, (2) monitor its consistency, and (3) manage behavioral leakage—all of which compete for finite working-memory resources, resulting in disfluencies and pauses. The present findings are consistent with information processing theory (IPT), which stipulates that human cognitive capacity is limited and that complex or novel tasks (such as fabricating a coherent account under interrogative pressure) necessitate increased processing time, manifested acoustically as pauses and hesitations (Paas, Van Merriënboer, & Adam, 1994). Notably, the Ambiguous group in this study showed pause characteristics intermediate between Truthful and Deceptive groups, suggesting that intentional vagueness or partial concealment also elevates cognitive load, albeit not to the degree required for wholesale fabrication. The strong correlation between pause duration and self-reported difficulty in post-interrogation debriefs (reported descriptively in case notes) lends additional ecological validity to the pause-as-cognitive-load hypothesis.

The distribution of ADCM path types across veracity categories offers novel evidence for the validity of the modified ADCM framework in

forensic and institutional settings. The Direct Truth Path (characterized by rapid activation of veridical information, minimal deliberation, and direct formulation) was predominantly observed in the Likely Truthful group (76%), whereas the Strategic Lie Path (activation of cover story, rapid commitment to a false narrative, and reduced subsequent iteration) dominated the Likely Deceptive group (41%), and the Iterative Lie-Construction Path (multiple cycles of activation, decision-making, construction, and backtracking) appeared most frequently in segments marked by acoustic instability and temporal prolongation (47% of Likely Deceptive, 31% of Ambiguous). This distribution aligns with the theoretical prediction that different veracity conditions engage qualitatively distinct cognitive processes. The original ADCM, proposed by Walczyk et al. (2003), posited three main mechanisms: (1) activation of relevant memory (truth or fabricated content), (2) decision to lie or tell the truth based on self-interest, and (3) construction of a plausible narrative. The present study's modification—introducing explicit backtracking and looping—was motivated by observations that many deceptive speakers do not follow a linear trajectory; instead, they activate a potential lie, recognize its implausibility mid-construction, loop back to reconsider, revise, and re-construct. This iterative process is invisible to the naked ear but is detectable via the conjunction of acoustic data (pauses, F0 instability) and temporal analysis. The finding that 47% of deceptive segments exhibit this iterative pattern provides strong empirical justification for the theoretical modification and extends Walczyk et al.'s framework to account for the dynamic, real-time negotiation of deceptive narratives observed in authentic interrogations.

The integration of reaction time (RT) as an additional marker of cognitive load represents a methodological contribution that builds upon prior research by Vrij and Granhag (2012) and Bird (2018), who demonstrated that longer RT correlates with increased cognitive effort. In the present study, mean RT to formulate responses was 1.2 seconds for Likely Truthful segments, 2.8 seconds for Likely Deceptive segments, and 2.1 seconds for Ambiguous segments—a pattern consistent with the hypothesis that false-statement production requires additional

deliberation. When RT is combined with pause frequency and duration, a composite index of cognitive demand emerges that is more robust than any single indicator. This finding supports the information-processing perspective that cognitive load is a multidimensional construct, best captured through multiple convergent indicators (Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 2003). The present study's use of video-recorded interrogations and precise temporal coding allowed RT to be measured objectively, avoiding the self-report biases that have plagued some prior deception research conducted in laboratory settings with artificial tasks (Porter and Brinke, 2010).

From a theoretical standpoint, the results indicate that the modified ADCM serves as a parsimonious yet comprehensive model for understanding deceptive speech cognition. Unlike purely neurobiological accounts that focus on brain activation patterns (e.g., fMRI studies showing prefrontal cortex engagement during deception) or purely linguistic accounts that catalog lexical/syntactic markers, the modified ADCM provides a cognitive architecture that (1) is testable via observable acoustic-linguistic data, (2) accommodates individual variation in lie-production strategies, (3) incorporates feedback loops that reflect real-time cognitive dynamics, and (4) links cognitive processing directly to measurable acoustic consequences. The framework thus bridges the explanatory gap between cognition and observable behavior, a goal that has eluded much prior deception research. Moreover, the model's flexibility—allowing for Direct Truth, Strategic Lie, and Iterative Lie-Construction paths—acknowledges that not all deception is identical, a nuance often overlooked in binary truth-vs.-lie classification systems. This theoretical sophistication aligns with recent calls in the deception-detection literature for context-sensitive, multimodal approaches that recognize the heterogeneity of lying (Vrij & Granhag, 2012; Porter & ten Brinke, 2010).

The implications of these findings extend beyond academic cognitive science to practical applications in law enforcement and institutional interrogation. If cognitive load can be reliably indexed through acoustic-linguistic markers aligned with the modified ADCM, then interrogators could potentially recognize high-

cognitive-load speech in real time and adjust questioning strategies—for example, by slowing the pace of questions to allow more processing time or by introducing unexpected contextual details to destabilize a false narrative that has become over-rehearsed and efficient. Such interventions would be grounded in cognitive theory rather than relying on debunked techniques (e.g., the “Reid technique”) that assume deception produces uniformly identifiable behavioral signatures (Hartwig & Bond, 2014). Furthermore, the present study’s emphasis on iterative cognitive processes suggests that examiners should attend not only to what is said but to patterns of revision, hesitation, and acoustic instability that signal ongoing cognitive struggle. This aligns with evidence-based approaches to credibility assessment that emphasize consistency, detail, and coherence—criteria that are more easily maintained by truth-tellers than by liars navigating complex false narratives.

In conclusion, the present study’s findings provide substantial empirical support for the modified Activation Decision Construction Model as a comprehensive framework for understanding cognitive load in deceptive speech during high-stakes anti-corruption interrogations. The convergence of normalized F0 elevation, prolonged pause duration, reaction-time prolongation, and iterative ADCM-path frequencies in deceptive segments offers a multi-level account of how deception engages cognitive resources differently from truth-telling. These results extend and refine prior research by Walczyk et al. (2003), Vrij and Granhag (2012), and El-Zawawy (2017), while also demonstrating the feasibility of applying cognitive-deception theory to authentic institutional settings. Future research should explore the generalizability of these findings across languages, cultural contexts, and interrogation styles, and should investigate whether real-time feedback on cognitive-load markers can improve interrogative practice and investigative outcomes.

5.CONCLUSION

This study investigated the relationship between cognitive load and deceptive speech in anti-corruption interrogations through the lens of a modified Activation Decision Construction Model (ADCM). By integrating

acoustic-linguistic markers (fundamental frequency, pause duration, and reaction time) with cognitive-processing theory, we sought to answer three central research questions: (1) whether acoustic-linguistic patterns differ systematically across veracity categories in authentic interrogation data, (2) whether the modified ADCM—incorporating backtracking and iterative cognitive loops—provides a valid framework for characterizing distinct deception-production pathways, and (3) whether observable cognitive signatures can be reliably aligned with theoretical predictions of differential cognitive load. The findings provide affirmative and robust support for all three research questions.

The primary empirical contributions of this study are fourfold. First, we demonstrated that normalized fundamental frequency (F0) constitutes a reliable acoustic marker of deception in the interrogation context, with Likely Deceptive segments exhibiting a mean z-score of +0.52 compared to 0.38 for Likely Truthful segments (effect size $d = 0.90$). This difference aligns with phonetic theories of stress-induced vocal elevation and corroborates decades of prior deception research conducted in laboratory and naturalistic settings, extending the generalizability of F0-as-deception-cue to the specific domain of institutional interrogations regarding corruption. Second, we established that pause frequency and total pause duration provide complementary indicators of cognitive load, with Likely Deceptive segments exhibiting significantly more and longer pauses (mean 3.8 pauses, 2.1 seconds total) compared to Likely Truthful segments (mean 1.5 pauses, 0.6 seconds total). These findings directly support the information-processing hypothesis that lie production requires additional cognitive resources, manifested as disfluencies and hesitations. Third, we introduced and validated reaction time (RT) as an objective, observer-independent measure of cognitive demand in interrogation settings, finding that deceptive responses required substantially longer formulation time (mean 2.8 seconds) compared to truthful responses (mean 1.2 seconds). The consistency of RT findings with F0 and pause patterns indicates that

cognitive load operates as a multidimensional construct detectable through convergent indicators. Fourth, and most significantly, we demonstrated that the modified ADCM—which incorporates explicit backtracking and iterative cognitive loops—successfully accounts for the heterogeneity of deceptive speech production. The observed distribution of path types (Direct Truth Path predominating in truthful segments at 76%, Strategic Lie Path at 41% in deceptive segments, and Iterative Lie-Construction Path at 47% in deceptive segments) aligns precisely with theoretical predictions and provides empirical justification for the ADCM modification, addressing a long-standing limitation in cognitive-deception research: the oversimplification of lying as a unidirectional cognitive process.

From a theoretical standpoint, this study makes several important contributions to the deception literature. The modified ADCM represents a conceptual advance over the original formulation by Walczyk et al. (2003) insofar as it explicitly models the real-time, dynamic negotiation of false narratives—a process that our data indicate occurs in nearly half of all deceptive interrogation segments. This iterative-processing model aligns with contemporary cognitive science emphasizing the role of error monitoring, conflict detection, and revision in complex linguistic and reasoning tasks. The present findings suggest that deceptive speech is not the product of a single, pre-formed false narrative executed without modification, but rather involves ongoing cognitive struggle as the liar monitors and revises her account against competing pressures: the need for plausibility, consistency with prior statements, coherence with interrogator-provided information, and avoidance of detectable behavioral leakage. The acoustic signatures of this struggle—elevated F0, frequent pauses, and temporal prolongation—are not merely incidental correlates of deception but are theoretically meaningful manifestations of the cognitive processes underlying lie production. By bridging cognitive theory, acoustic phonetics, and temporal analysis, the present study offers a more complete understanding of how deception is produced

and detected than prior work relying on single modalities or oversimplified cognitive models.

From a methodological standpoint, the study demonstrates the feasibility and value of integrating multiple data sources in deception research. Rather than relying exclusively on acoustic features, linguistic markers, or cognitive tests administered in isolation, we employed a multimodal approach that leverages the complementary strengths of different measurement systems. Video-recorded interrogations permitted objective coding of reaction time; acoustic analysis yielded precise measurements of F0 and pause characteristics; and temporal alignment with speech content and interrogator questions allowed for cognitive-phase classification consistent with the modified ADCM. This integration was not merely additive but synergistic: the conjunction of elevated F0, prolonged pauses, extended RT, and iterative ADCM-path switching provided stronger evidence for deception-linked cognitive load than any single indicator could have supplied. The methodological framework developed in this study is replicable and can be adapted to other languages, interrogation styles, and investigative contexts.

From a practical standpoint, the findings have direct relevance to law enforcement and institutional interrogation practice. If cognitive load in deceptive speech can be reliably indexed through observable acoustic-linguistic markers, then interrogators and investigators can potentially improve detection accuracy and interview quality by adopting cognitive-load-informed questioning strategies. Rather than relying on debunked techniques such as the Reid Technique—which rests on the erroneous assumption that deception produces uniform, easily identifiable behavioral signatures—interrogators informed by the present research could employ evidence-based approaches that recognize the heterogeneity of deceptive cognition and the acoustic consequences of differential cognitive load. For example, interrogators might introduce unexpected contextual details or ask for reversed temporal accounts (e.g., "Walk me through your activities that day, starting from the end

and working backward")—interventions that have been shown in prior research to increase cognitive demand and thus amplify observable deception cues. Additionally, the recognition that approximately half of deceptive segments involve iterative cognitive processing (backtracking and revision) suggests that examiners should attend closely to statements marked by hesitation, qualification, and self-correction, as these may signal real-time recognition that an initially constructed false narrative is implausible and requires revision. Nevertheless, this study has several limitations that should be acknowledged and that suggest avenues for future research. First, the sample, while authentic and ecologically valid, is relatively small (N = 102 segments from 15 speakers and 12 interrogation sessions) and geographically and culturally bounded (Indonesian anti-corruption investigations). Replication studies with larger samples, diverse languages, and different interrogation styles are necessary to establish the generalizability of the findings. Second, although the modified ADCM provides a flexible and theoretically grounded framework, cognitive-phase assignment (Activation, Decision, Construction, Integration) is necessarily inferred from acoustic and temporal data rather than measured directly through concurrent neurobiological or self-report methods. Future research employing fMRI, eye-tracking, or real-time cognitive interviews could provide converging evidence for the validity of ADCM-phase classifications. Third, this study examined deception in a specific institutional context (corruption interrogations) involving specific types of falsifiable claims (financial transactions, organizational procedures). The extent to which findings generalize to other types of deception (e.g., fabrication of emotional experiences, denial of knowledge) remains uncertain. Fourth, the study did not systematically manipulate interrogator behavior or questioning strategy; thus, causal inferences about how interrogator-initiated cognitive load affects deceptive-speech acoustics cannot be firmly drawn. In conclusion, this study provides substantial empirical evidence that cognitive load in

deceptive speech during anti-corruption interrogations is reliably associated with specific acoustic-linguistic markers and follows predictable patterns captured by the modified Activation Decision Construction Model. By demonstrating the convergence of F0 elevation, pause prolongation, reaction-time extension, and iterative cognitive-path switching in deceptive segments, we have advanced both theoretical understanding and practical capability in the domain of deception detection. Future research should extend these findings to additional languages, contexts, and interrogation modalities, investigate real-time detection and feedback mechanisms, and examine the effectiveness of cognitive-load-informed interrogation strategies in improving investigative outcomes. Ultimately, the integration of cognitive science, acoustic analysis, and institutional interrogation practice offers promise for more effective, evidence-based approaches to credibility assessment and investigative interviewing.

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